



THE POWER OF ONE PARTNER TO BIND THE FIRM
BY SEALED INSTRUMENT.
That one partner cannot bind his copartners by any iustru-
ment under seal, is a general rule firmly established, and we
believe not questioned by any decision, either in England or
America. The leading case is Harrison v. Jackson, 7 Term Rep.
207, decided by the Court of King's Beach, in 1797. In deliv-
ering the opinion of the court, Lord KENYON, 0. J., said:
"The power of binding each other by deed is now, for the
first time, insisted on. * * * Then it was said, if this part-
nership were constituted by writing under seal, that gave au-
thority to each to bind the others by deed; but I deny that
consequence just as positively as the former; for a general
partnership agreement, though under seal, does not authorize
the partners to execute deeds for each other, unless a particu.
lar power be given for that purpose. This would be a most
alarming doctrine to hold out to the mercantile world, if one
partner could bind the others by such a deed as the present,
it would extend to the case of mortgages, and would enable
a partner to give to a favorite creditor a real lien on the es-
tates of the other partners."
The same point had already been decided in Pennsylvania,
thirteen years earlier, in Giraid v. Basse et aZ, 1 Dallas 119.
Vol. XVIII.-1T* (265)
POWER OF PARTNER TO BIND
In that case, one partner had executed a bond and warrant to
confess judgment, to which there was one seal, and the signa-
ture, "John A. Soyer, for Basse & Soyer." Judgment was en-
tered on the bond against both partners, and the court held it
good only as to the one signing, and gave the plaintiff leave
to strike out the name of the other. In delivering the opinion
of the court, SHIPPEN, President, said: "There. can be nfo
doubt that in the course of trade the act of one partner is the
act of both. Ttfere is virtual authority for that purpose, mu-
tually given by entering into partnership, and in everything
that relates to their usual dealings, each must be considered
as the attorney of the other. But this principle cannot be ex-
tended further to embrace objects out of the course of trade.
It does not authorize one to execute a deed for the other; this does
not result from their connection as partners; and there is not
a single instance in the books which can countenance such an
implication."
The principle thus laid down in these two cases has been
very rigidly adhered to in England, but in the United States
there has always been more or less disposition to limit its gene-
rality, and though, as a general rule, it has not been shaken,
yet several important exceptions may now be considered as
firmly established in most of the States. Thus in Hart v.
Withers, 1 Penn. Rep. 285, though the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided that the other partners were not bound
by the deed, notwithstanding it had been given in a transac-
tion in the course of business of the firm, and the benefit had
been received by them, yet HUSTON, J., dissented, and stated
his reasons so briefly and pointedly that they are well worth
reproducing in his own language: "The grounds on which one
partner is not permitted to bind the other by deed, in England,
do not exist, or, at least, all of them do not exist here. They
are: 1st. That the consideration of a deed cannot be inquired
into-here it can. 2d. That a bond will bind the lands of any
partner whohas lands, afterhis death-here a common note, nay
account, is recovered after the death of the debtor, out of land.
It is admitted, even there, that one partner may bind another
by bond, sealed in his presence, although with but one seal.
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This must be solely because his assent is clearly proved by his
being present and agreeing, not dissenting; now I cannot see
why assent clearly proved in one way is not as effectual as as-
sent clearly proved in another. Here the offer was to prove
that each of the partners, who were iron masters and had lands
in partnership, as well as chattels, were in the constant habit
of making contracts under seal, which were ratified by the
others, and the benefits enjoyed by them-that this contract,
on the face of it for Wrood, was for wood for their iron works,
and was actually used at them and the benefit enjoyed by them
all. I would then have permitted this to go to the jury, and
if they found a clear assent either before or after, I would hold
them bound. One partner is often bound in equity, differently
from what he is at law, because he has received the benefit:
Lang v. Keppele, 1 Bin. 123. I would confine the power to
partnership transactions, and to property which came into
partnership, and was enjoyed by them under a contract which
they knew was made by one of firm."
Subsequent cases, not onlyin Pennsylvania, butin most of the
other States, have established the law in substantial conformity
with the principles of Judge HUSTON's opinion. The leading
cases on this point are Gram v. Seton, 1 Hall 262, and Cady v.
Shepherd, 11 Pickering 400. In the former case the Superior
Court of New York city determined that one partner cannot
make a sealed instrument, even though it be necessary in the
usual course of business of the firm, unless authorized by the
other partners, but authority need not be given expressly or
under seal, but may be implied from the nature of the business
or the conduct of the partners. The instrument sued on in
that case was a charter party, but an elaborate opinion was
given by JoNEs, 0. J., covering the whole class of sealedinstru-
ments. In the other case, Cady v. Shepherd, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held that the instrument would be valid and
bind the firm, if previously authorized or subsequently ratified
by them, and that such authority or ratification may be by
parol. It may now be taken as settled law in most of the
States, that either previous authority to a partner or subse-
quent ratification will make his deed valid to bind the firm,
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and that such authority or ratification may be by parol: Fich
thorn v Boyer, 5 Watts 159; Bond v. Aithin, 6 W. & S. 165
(overruling Hart v. Withers, 1 Penn. 285, and adopting the
reasoning of HUSTON, J., already quoted); ffackey v. Bood-
good, 9 Johns 285; Smith v. Kerr, 3 Oomst. 144; Swan v.
Stedman, 4 Met. 548; Pilce v. Bacon, 8 Shepl. 280; Flemin!,
v. Dunbar, 2 Hill, S. 0. 532; Fant v. West, 10 Rich. Law
149; Drumright v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424; Grady v. Robinson,
28 Ala. 289; Gwin v. Rookber, 24 Mo. 290; Price v. Alexan-
der, 2 Greene, Iowa, 427; Haynes v. Seachrest, 13 Iowa 455;
Henderson v. Barbee, 6 Blackf. 26; Day v. Lafferty, 4 Pike
450; 3fcDonald v. Egleson, 26 Vt. 154; Remington v. Cum-
mings, 5 Wis. 138; Wilson v. Hunter, 14 Wis. 63; Shirley
v. Fearne, 33 Mi. 653; Fox v. Norton, 9 Mich. 207; Charman
v. HcLane, 1 Or. 339; Lowry v. Drew, 18 Tex. 786.
In a few of the States, however, it would seem that the strict
technical reasoning of the English cases has prevailed, and it
is held that to make the deed good there must be express an
thority (or ratification) un'ler seal: Listle v. IHazzard, 5 Har
rington 291; Tarbeville v. Ryan, 1 Humphreys 113; Napier
v. Catron, 2 Hump. 534. In Kentucky the question hardly
seems settled. The early cases of Trimble v. Coons, 2 A. K.
Mars 375, and (lummings v. Carsity, 5 B. Mon. 74, held that
the authority must be under seal, but the later case of Ely v.
Hair, 16 Mon. 230, goes upon the ground that parol authority
or ratification will be sufficient, but does not notice or ex-
pressly overrule the previous decisions.
Trimble v. Coons, Peirson v. Carter, 3 Murphy 321, and a few
other of the earlier American case.i, appear to sanction the
English rule (founded on the ancient decisions, that the same
piece of wax might servefor the seals of several obligors), that if
the deed was sealed by one in the actual presence of the other, it
would bind both, thus making a most singular confusion of the
authorityitself, andthe evidenceby which it is proved, thefoun-
dation of an unsubstantial distinction effectually disposed of by
a few words in the opinion of HUSTON, J., in Hart v. Withers.
already quoted. This distinction is not, how-ever, abandoned
in most of the American cases. In lfodisett v. Lindley, 2
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Blakf. 119, it is expressly held that presence is merely evi-
denc6 of consent, for there the partner, though present, not
having knowledge of the act, was held not bound. But in
Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cash. 483, it is held that signing by
one person (whether partner or not) for anot her in hispresence,
and by his express direction, is as good as signing by the latter;
the opinionof SAw, 0. J., though very brief, and apparently
not much considered, appearing to sustain the soundness of the
distinction between an act done in or out of the presence of the
party sought to be charged. In Lambden v. Sharp, 9 Hum-
phreys 224, it was held that where there are more signatures
than seals, the court will presume that several of the parties
adopted the same seal, but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence, and it will then be a question for the jury whether
the instrument is sealed by all. And if the signature be in the
firm name only, it will be presumed to be the several signature
and seal of all the partners, but open to rebuttal by plea and
evidence as in other cases. To the same effect are Davis v.
Burton, 3 Scam. 41, and Hatch v. Crawford, 2 Porter (A1a.)54.
In all the foregoing cases it is to be borne in mind that the
instrument must be made in the firm name, and purpbrt to be
the act of the firm. For if the partner, though authorized to
execute a deed in the partnership name, does in fact make it in
his own name merely, it will bind himself only, and will more-
over merge the firm debt, if the latter be on a simple contract,
so as to discharge the other partners: United States v. Ashley,
3 Wash. 0. 0. 508. And the same effect will follow, according
to the authority of some cases, if the partner signing the firm
name is not authorized to do so. In such ease the suit should
be against the party signing as on his individual obligation:
Clement v. Brush, 3 Johns. Gas. 180; Button v. Hampson,
Wright (Ohio) 93; iNfunnely v. Doherty, 1 Yerger 26; Waugh
v. Carriger, Id..31 ; Morris v. Jones, 4 Harring. 428. And if
the bond be declared on against both as a joint obligation, no
recovery can be had even against the one who signed: Lucas v.
Sanders, 1 McMullan 311. In an action.by a firm, however,
on a sealed instrument, the defendant cannot plead that it was
executed by one partner only, for the suit is a ratification by
all who are joined in it: Dodge v. Hc Kay, 4 Ala. 346.
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The doctrine that a bond in the firm name by a partner not
authorized to make it, merges a simple contract debt of the flrni
and substitutes the sealed obligation of the partner signing, ha
not, however, commanded universal assent. In Doniphan v.
Gill, 1 B. Mon. 199, it was expressly rejected, the court hold-
ing that there could be no merger where it appeared on the
face of the instrument that there was no such intention in the
minds of the parties at the time of the execution. To the same
effect, apparently, are Fronebarger v. Henry, 6 Jones, Law,
•548, and Despatch Line v. Bellamy Han. Go., 12 N. H. 235.
All of the foregoing cases, moreover, assume that the trans-
actionin which the bond is made is one arising in the due course
of the partnership business. Otherwise the partner is on the
same footing with any stranger, and to validate his act it must
appear to have been expressly authorized under seal. Thus in
Ruffner v. McConnel, 17 Ills. 212, it was held that one partner,
even though expressly authorized by parol, cannot convey land
or make a contract specifically enforcible against the others.
See also Bewly v. Innis, 5 Harris 485, and Snyder v. May, 7
Harris 235. For the same reason bonds of submission to arbi-
tration, and warrants to confess judgment, have been uniformly
held invalid, unless authorized by sealed instrument; they are
not in the regular course of business, and, therefore, not part-
nership transactions: Karthaus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 222; Crane
v. French, 1 Wend. 311; Armstrong v. Robinson, 5 G. & J.
412; Barlow v. Reno, 1 Blackf. 252; Sloo v. State Bank, 1
Scam.428; Mills v. Dickson, 1 Richards 487. But if an award
be made; and the money received by both, or by one in the firm
name, the acceptance will be good either as a release or as
accord and satisfaction: Buchanan v. Curry, 19 Johns. 137;
Lee v. Onstott 1 Pike 206.
Having thus considered how one partner may bind his
copartners by sealed instrument, with their consent, and how
that consent may be proved, we come now to how he may bind
them without their consent. And first, he may release a debt by
sealed instrument. This is well settled both in England andthe
United States: Bowen v. Marquand, 17 Johns. 58; Smith v.
Stone, 4 Gill & J. 310; Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 549; and
he may authorize an agent, under seal, to release: Rl -. ls v.
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Evans, 20 Wend. 251; S. C., 22 Wend. 324. So he may sign
a composition-deed with a debtor of the firm: Beach v. Ollen.
dorf, 1 Hilton 41. The reason that a release is good is stated
by KENT, C. J., in Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68, to be that
the deed is good as to the partner signing, and a release by onh
of joint creditors is good as to all, citing Ruddock's case, 6 Co.
25. Perhaps an equally satisfactory reason is, that the rule
itself which makes the deed of one partner in the partnership
name bad, extends only to those cases in which the effect of the
deed would be to charge the partners with a new liability.
A second class of cases, where a partner may bind his copart-
ners under seal without their consent, express or implied, was
marked out by Chief Justice MARSHALL at an early day. In
Anderson v. TomTpkins, 1 Brock 456, he said: "The principle
of Harrison v. Jackson is settled. But I cannot admit its appli-
cation in a case where the property maybe transferred by de-
livery under a parol contract. I cannot admit that a sale so
consummated is annulled by the circumstance that it is attested
by a deed." The principle thus enunciated has always been
favorably regarded by the American courts, and it is now well
settled in most of the States, that if the act done would have
been valid without a seal, the addition of the seal does not
vitiate it: Tapley v. Butterfield, 1 Met. (Mass.) 515; lilton v.
Mfosher, 7 Metc.'244; Everitt v. Strong, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 163;
Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCord 537; Dubois's Appeal, 2
Wright (Penn.) 236; Deckard v. Case, 5 Watts 22; AlcCul-
lough v. Summerville, 8 Leigh 415; Forkner v. Stuart, 6 Grat-
tan 197; Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. 280; Human v.
Cuniffe, 32 Mo. 316. - In Kentucky, however, and perhaps in
the other States where the strict ruling of the English cases is
followed, this exception is not allowed. Thus in Montgomery
v. Boone, 2 B. Monr. 214, ROBERTSON, C. J., says: "The prif.
ciple thus settled as to deeds, seems to have been recognized as
applicable to all contracts under seal to pay money, even
though a seal was not essential to the obligation of such con.
tract. This may have been a perversion or extension of the
principle as to deeds which was probably applicable at first only
to such writings as would be ineffectual without a seal, and not
to such as might be as binding and effectual without as with a
